Regional War in Iran

The Strait of Hormuz has become Tehran's main arena of strategic pressure. Its geography and its weight in oil and gas transport make it a lever of influence over energy markets and the Gulf states. During the war Iran threatened to disrupt navigation and attacks on commercial vessels were recorded, while the United States imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports.

The maritime situation remains unstable. On 12 November Reuters reported that Iranian military authorities attributed to naval mines the explosions suffered by four tankers over two days, an account the agency could not independently verify. Separately, the UK agency UKMTO reported a vessel hit by an unidentified projectile near Ras al-Khaimah, in the United Arab Emirates, whose fire forced the crew to evacuate.

Attacks on vessels intensified in October and in the first days of November. According to Washington Institute for Near East Policy data cited by Reuters, there were 37 attacks in October, the most intense month since the war began, and at least ten in the first ten days of November. Although traffic had partially recovered, persistent incidents keep insurance, freight and naval-security costs high.

The US blockade is also an instrument of economic pressure: restrictions on exports and port activity limit Iran's ability to earn revenue and sustain its supply chains. Tehran regards lifting the blockade as a precondition for any agreement, which makes Hormuz a space of military, economic and diplomatic confrontation at the same time.

The nuclear programme is one of the war's main strategic uncertainties. The strikes on Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan damaged key facilities, but do not allow the conclusion that Iran has lost all its nuclear capabilities or that the enriched material has been destroyed.

Before the June 2025 strikes, Iran had accumulated 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, according to the IAEA. The agency's Director General, Rafael Grossi, estimated that just over 200 kilograms would remain in the Isfahan tunnels and that another part is at Natanz. These volumes are estimates, not confirmed inventories: the IAEA's lack of access makes it impossible to establish with certainty the material's current location and condition.

The IAEA's September 2026 report states that, after the strikes that began in February, the Agency stopped receiving information and access to verify declared facilities, with the exception of one inspection at the Bushehr power plant. As a result, it cannot confirm whether Iran has suspended enrichment, determine the quantity and location of its enriched uranium stockpile or verify its centrifuge inventories. This loss of continuity of knowledge is a proliferation concern even without conclusive evidence that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon.

One of the main points of concern is Kuh-e Kolang, known as Pickaxe Mountain, an underground complex near Natanz. Satellite imagery published by international media has shown construction and reinforcement of tunnel entrances. These observations do not by themselves demonstrate an operational enrichment facility, but the site's possible function and the absence of inspections make it a central point of monitoring.

Iran's position hardened in November. On 2 and 9 November the Iranian Foreign Ministry reiterated that the country will not accept the transfer of its enriched material abroad, which limits one of the negotiating formulas that envisaged its transfer or external custody.

The diplomatic track remains open, but faces substantial differences over the conditions for ending the war. Pakistan's mediation produced a ceasefire in April and a memorandum of understanding in June, with a 60-day window to negotiate the nuclear programme, sanctions relief, the naval blockade and the security of the Strait of Hormuz.

The memorandum did not become a peace agreement. Continued military operations, disputes over compliance and the lack of consensus on nuclear conditions prevented a stable solution. By August, according to the UK Parliament's analysis, the memorandum had lost its standing as an operational framework and there were no active formal negotiations to end the war.

In November indirect contacts resumed through regional mediators. Iran demands the lifting of the naval blockade and of sanctions, guarantees that hostilities will cease and a new framework for navigation through Hormuz. Washington considers some of these demands unacceptable, and Tehran maintains that it will not negotiate under military and economic pressure.

On 12 November President Donald Trump removed Vice President JD Vance from the negotiations with Iran and said the United States no longer needs an agreement with Tehran. The decision adds uncertainty over the continuity of the negotiating channel and over the weight of diplomacy relative to military and economic pressure.

The war is unfolding on top of an internal crisis that predates the offensive. The January 2026 protests, state repression and deteriorating economic conditions reflect persistent social discontent. The regime maintains surveillance, detentions and control of communications, while economic restrictions and the blockade hit public revenue, commercial activity and household purchasing power.

Ali Khamenei's death and Mojtaba Khamenei's succession introduced a new configuration of power. Although the new supreme leader formally holds the system's highest authority, various analyses point to greater IRGC influence and increased dependence on the military and security structures. There are also internal differences over whether to negotiate with the United States and on what terms.

The economic crisis is deepening through the combination of sanctions, naval blockade, falling external revenue and damage to infrastructure. Difficulties in exporting oil and accessing foreign currency limit the government's ability to stabilise prices and sustain public spending. In this context, the risk of new protests rises if economic decline combines with a perception of institutional weakness or with divisions among regime elites.

The confrontation has also had a diplomatic expression with consequences for Argentina. On 11 November 2026 Iran designated the Argentine Navy and Air Force as terrorist organisations, in response to Argentina's listing of the IRGC in its terrorist-organisations registry. The Argentine government rejected the measure. The episode is a bilateral diplomatic escalation that may affect political and security relations between the two countries.

In September 1980 Iraq invaded Iran, starting an eight-year war that caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, economic devastation and a deep militarisation of the state. During this period the IRGC expanded its capabilities and became a central institution for the regime's defence and the projection of regional influence.

The war also reinforced Iran's sense of vulnerability to external threats, an experience that shaped the development of asymmetric military capabilities, ballistic missiles and indirect deterrence.

After Khomeini's death in 1989, Ali Khamenei became supreme leader. Over the following decades he consolidated a power structure in which religious institutions, the Revolutionary Guards and the security agencies held decisive influence. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency promoted economic reconstruction and a limited opening, without altering the regime's core structure.

Mohammad Khatami's election in 1997 opened a period of political reform and greater participation by moderate groups. Attempts to expand civil liberties and curb the power of conservative institutions met resistance within the system, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory in 2005 marked a turn towards more confrontational domestic and foreign policies.

In June 2009 Ahmadinejad's re-election was contested by large sections of the population and sparked the Green Movement. The protests were suppressed by the security forces, consolidating the dominance of conservative structures and narrowing the space for opposition.

Revelations about undeclared nuclear facilities in the early 2000s raised international concern about the nature of Iran's programme. Sanctions by the United Nations, the United States and the European Union progressively hit trade, the financial system and energy exports.

In July 2015 Iran and the P5+1 reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which set limits on the nuclear programme and a reinforced verification system in exchange for sanctions relief. In May 2018, during Donald Trump's first administration, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the agreement and restored sanctions; Iran then scaled back compliance with some obligations and raised its enrichment levels.

In September 2022 the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of the morality police sparked nationwide protests under the slogan «Woman, Life, Freedom». The demonstrations challenged social restrictions, institutional violence and the regime's legitimacy. The state's response included arrests, lethal force, prosecutions and internet restrictions.

The crisis of legitimacy persisted in the following years, as economic decline and sanctions weighed on living conditions. The January 2026 protests were a new expression of that social tension and were also suppressed.

In June 2025 Israel and the United States struck Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. The operations degraded parts of the programme but did not resolve concerns about the enriched-uranium stockpile and the continuity of technical capabilities. In September 2025 UN sanctions related to the nuclear programme came back into force, after the E3 triggered the snapback mechanism in late August.

On 28 February 2026 a second, broader US–Israeli offensive began, killing Ali Khamenei and senior regime commanders. Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed supreme leader in March. The war spread to the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz: Iran attacked regional targets and the United States imposed a naval blockade.

The April ceasefire and the June memorandum did not produce a lasting settlement. Continued strikes, maritime restrictions and disagreements over the nuclear programme kept the conflict active through the second half of 2026. As of 12 November, the Islamic Republic retains its core institutions but faces significant military, economic and diplomatic pressure.