Armed Crisis in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

In North Kivu, fighting between the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), backed by local militias known collectively as Wazalendo, and FRN fighters is concentrated mainly in Masisi and Walikale territories, according to MONUSCO's briefing to the Security Council on 29 September. In early November government forces retook several localities in Masisi, including Mirindano, Mahanga and Kilongo, after operations launched on 3 November in which at least four civilians were killed. Fighting nevertheless continued on the Kashebere–Kibati axis in Walikale territory, where the FRN still held positions. The interruption of traffic on the road linking Goma to Walikale via Nyabiondo deepens the isolation of communities and hampers the supply of essential goods.

In South Kivu the situation escalated again on the night of 6–7 November, when the FRN launched an offensive in Kalehe territory, in the Bunyakiri area. The fighters advanced through Kahuzi-Biega National Park and took several localities on National Road 3 (RN3), including Bitale and, on 8 November, the centre of Bulambika, after the FARDC withdrew; on the 9th there was fighting in Kambali, on the road towards Hombo. This corridor links Bukavu with Kisangani via Walikale and is a strategic route for the movement of people and goods. The army says it has halted the advance at Bulambika and is preparing a counter-offensive with the Wazalendo; local and military sources give partly differing accounts of how far the FRN has advanced. The offensive displaced some 166,500 people, according to a humanitarian alert of 9 November.

This escalation adds to the persistent tension in the highlands of Walungu, Fizi and the surroundings of Uvira. The latter city, which M23 occupied in December 2025, was abandoned by the movement between 17 and 18 January 2026 and retaken by government forces on 18 January. Its border location, close to Burundi, and its strategic importance keep the risk of a regionalisation of the conflict high. Burundi continues to deploy forces in support of the Congolese government, while reports by the United Nations Group of Experts have documented Rwanda’s military backing of M23. Kigali denies supporting the movement and maintains that its intervention responds to the threat posed by the presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) on Congolese territory. For its part, the DRC government has been singled out for its cooperation with the FDLR and other local armed groups. These mutual accusations reflect the regional dimension of the conflict and the involvement of armed actors beyond the regular forces of both countries.

On the diplomatic front, two complementary negotiation processes remain open, with different parties and objectives. On the one hand, the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity, promoted by the United States between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, seek to reduce bilateral tensions and establish security commitments. Their main provisions include the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Congolese territory and the neutralisation of the FDLR. On this last point disagreements persist: the Congolese government maintains that the protocol that, according to Kinshasa, it signed on 28 July 2026 with the FDLR, aimed at its disarmament, demobilisation and cantonment, constitutes progress in fulfilling its commitments; Rwanda, by contrast, considers that the initiative does not guarantee the effective neutralisation of the group and accuses Kinshasa of continuing to support it. In August the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, made up of representatives of both countries and international facilitators, met in Geneva to advance the implementation of the Washington commitments, according to Security Council Report.

On the other hand, the Doha Process, mediated by Qatar, brings together the Congolese government and the then AFC/M23. It rests on the Declaration of Principles signed on 19 July 2025 and on the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed on 15 November 2025. The latter provides for the negotiation of protocols on matters such as humanitarian access and judicial protection, the restoration of state authority, transitional security arrangements, the disarmament and demobilisation of armed groups, the return of displaced persons and refugees, economic and social recovery, and justice and reconciliation mechanisms. As of September 2026, the parties had signed only two of the planned protocols: the detainee release mechanism and the ceasefire oversight and verification mechanism. In August, representatives of the government and of AFC/M23 met in Switzerland, with the participation of Qatar, the United States, Togo, the African Union and Switzerland, to review progress and agree a roadmap for continuing the negotiations.

To oversee compliance with the ceasefire, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM+) was set in motion, with logistical support from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). During August and September 2026, verification missions were carried out in Minembwe and Masisi respectively. However, the continuation of clashes shows the limitations of these mechanisms in guaranteeing an effective cessation of hostilities. On 30 October, the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes Region urged the parties to fulfil their commitments under both the Washington and Doha frameworks, and expressed its concern at the persistence of fighting and the growing use of drones. In early November, the head of MONUSCO, James Swan, visited Goma and held meetings with Joseph Kabila and other FRN leaders to address the protection of civilians, humanitarian access and ceasefire monitoring.

The humanitarian situation remains critical and has worsened with the new offensive in South Kivu. As of 29 September the United Nations estimated 6.1 million internally displaced people in the country, and according to the IPC analysis of 30 October 28.8 million people are in acute food insecurity between September and December 2026, including 3.6 million in Emergency. Displacement caused by the fighting is compounded by humanitarian organisations' difficulty in reaching affected areas. The alert issued on 9 November on Bunyakiri estimated that 166,500 people had recently been displaced and pointed to urgent needs for food, water, shelter, health care and protection. On top of this crisis is the Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus, which affects eight provinces: according to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), as of 9 November the DRC had recorded 10,990 confirmed cases and 5,354 deaths. The outbreak has also reached Kenya. Insecurity and displacement hinder access to health services and obstruct epidemiological surveillance and the response to the outbreak.