State repression and civil resistance following Mahsa Amini protests
Last update: Feb 9, 2026
Internal tensions with risk of protests, repression and economic effects.
The conflict as process. Each event: context, actors and consequences.
The Sudanese civil war did not begin in April 2023, although that is when the world took notice. Its roots lie in the failed transition that followed the fall of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, after three decades of dictatorship and mass protests that united civilians and the military against the regime.
What followed was a democratization experiment doomed from the start. The Transitional Sovereign Council, composed of civilians and the military, never resolved the fundamental contradiction: who would control the guns during the democratization process? While civilians from the FFC (Forces for Freedom and Change) tried to build institutions, the generals consolidated economic and military power.
The tension between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary militia commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti", became the axis of the crisis. The RSF, born from Darfur militias and used by Bashir to crush rebellions, had transformed into a parallel army with its own funding (Darfur gold, UAE support) and tribal loyalties distinct from the state.
The tipping point came with the negotiation over integrating the RSF into the regular army. For Burhan, dissolving the RSF meant recovering the state monopoly on force. For Hemedti, integration meant losing autonomy and possibly facing war crimes trials in Darfur. The negotiation became a countdown to war.
On 15 April 2023, fighting erupted simultaneously in Khartoum, Darfur and other cities. What initially seemed a quick coup became a war of attrition. The SAF controls the formal state apparatus (airports, ministries), but the RSF dominates entire neighbourhoods of the capital and the gold trade.
The regionalization of the conflict complicates any solution. Egypt backs the SAF (institutionalism, state control), while the United Arab Emirates maintains financial ties with the RSF (commercial interests, counter-insurgency). The war has become a proxy for influence in the Horn of Africa and control of the Red Sea coast, vital for global trade.
Who holds power, who fights whom. Click to view the dossier.
The humanitarian crisis is not a byproduct — it is a central feature of the conflict.
Resolutions, sanctions, peace processes and ongoing investigations.
Projections for 6–12 months. Triggers, indicators and implications.
Continued economic hardship and unemployment Generational grievances (women, LGBTQ+, youth) Perceived regime weakness from internal divisions
International nuclear inspections reveal weapons program advances Israeli military action against nuclear sites Iranian regime faces existential threat from domestic uprising
Major military or security force defection Economic collapse and currency failure Unified opposition movement with clear leadership
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Size and frequency of demonstrations in major Iranian cities
Protests occur regularly but smaller scale than 2022-2023 peak. Security forces now more effective at preventing mass gatherings through preemptive arrests.
Number of death sentences carried out against protesters, activists, and political prisoners
2025 saw 120+ death sentences against protest participants. International outcry ineffective in stopping executions.
Inflation rate, unemployment, currency devaluation, and access to medicines
Inflation exceeded 40% in 2025; unemployment at 16%; medicine shortages critical. Economic distress fueling continued unrest.
IAEA reports on uranium enrichment levels, centrifuge installations, weapons-grade material production
IAEA reports Iran enriching uranium to 84% purity (near weapons-grade). Inspectors restricted from accessing certain sites.
IRGC operations in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen; weapons shipments, militia training
Proxy activities continue despite domestic crisis. Hezbollah funding continues; Houthis remain armed; Syria operations ongoing.
Data on Iran's political instability comes from Amnesty International documentation, Human Rights Watch reports, the Iran Human Rights Monitor, UN fact-finding mission reports, UNHCR refugee data, and independent international media coverage. Death figures from protests vary between 500-600 depending on source, reflecting difficulties in independent verification. Economic data comes from IMF analysis and sanctions reports. Analysis acknowledges the difficulty of obtaining independently verified information from within Iran due to media restrictions.
Iran stands at a historical crossroads. The 2022 Mahsa Amini protests revealed deep discontent with the theocratic system, particularly among women, youth, and minorities. The regime has responded with brutal repression, including executions of protesters, but has been unable to fully suppress the protest movement. Simultaneously, Iran's nuclear program continues accelerating, in apparent response to international isolation and domestic tensions. The combination of internal political crisis, economic collapse, and potential regional conflict escalation represents a volatile situation with severe humanitarian consequences. The regime's fate and its regional impact will remain uncertain in coming years.
International Affairs Watch