Two decades of criminal conflict and synthetic drugs
Last update: Feb 9, 2026
Organized crime-related violence with persistent impacts on security and regional governance.
The conflict as process. Each event: context, actors and consequences.
The Sudanese civil war did not begin in April 2023, although that is when the world took notice. Its roots lie in the failed transition that followed the fall of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, after three decades of dictatorship and mass protests that united civilians and the military against the regime.
What followed was a democratization experiment doomed from the start. The Transitional Sovereign Council, composed of civilians and the military, never resolved the fundamental contradiction: who would control the guns during the democratization process? While civilians from the FFC (Forces for Freedom and Change) tried to build institutions, the generals consolidated economic and military power.
The tension between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary militia commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti", became the axis of the crisis. The RSF, born from Darfur militias and used by Bashir to crush rebellions, had transformed into a parallel army with its own funding (Darfur gold, UAE support) and tribal loyalties distinct from the state.
The tipping point came with the negotiation over integrating the RSF into the regular army. For Burhan, dissolving the RSF meant recovering the state monopoly on force. For Hemedti, integration meant losing autonomy and possibly facing war crimes trials in Darfur. The negotiation became a countdown to war.
On 15 April 2023, fighting erupted simultaneously in Khartoum, Darfur and other cities. What initially seemed a quick coup became a war of attrition. The SAF controls the formal state apparatus (airports, ministries), but the RSF dominates entire neighbourhoods of the capital and the gold trade.
The regionalization of the conflict complicates any solution. Egypt backs the SAF (institutionalism, state control), while the United Arab Emirates maintains financial ties with the RSF (commercial interests, counter-insurgency). The war has become a proxy for influence in the Horn of Africa and control of the Red Sea coast, vital for global trade.
Who holds power, who fights whom. Click to view the dossier.
The humanitarian crisis is not a byproduct — it is a central feature of the conflict.
Resolutions, sanctions, peace processes and ongoing investigations.
Projections for 6–12 months. Triggers, indicators and implications.
Death of major cartel leaders US cartel extraditions Territorial power vacuums Gang competition intensification
Government corruption expansion Electoral influence by cartels International pressure reduction Economic integration of cartel businesses
Fentanyl supply surge to US Major US city opioid crisis Cross-border cartel operations Congressional pressure for intervention
conflictDetail.indicators.subtitle
Monthly and annual murder statistics across Mexican states and federal level
Holding at 32,000+ annually; some volatility by state; urban centers experiencing persistent violence
Quantity of fentanyl intercepted at borders and in transit
Seizures increasing but represent small fraction of total supply; production capability expanding
Gender-based violence killings and sexual assault rates
10+ women murdered daily; impunity rate above 90%; gang violence driving surge
Number of internally displaced persons due to cartel violence
420K IDPs; many becoming migrants to USA; rural communities severely affected
Major arrests, deaths, or succession events in criminal hierarchies
Sinaloa in succession transition; CJNG consolidating power; potential for violence spike
Data in this analysis derives from Mexico's SSPC, UNODC, US agencies (DEA, FBI), and human rights organizations. Statistics reflect estimates as of January 2026. Analyses incorporate regional security reports and cartel monitoring.
Organized crime violence in Mexico represents one of the hemisphere's greatest security threats. With 32,500 annual deaths and a fentanyl epidemic deeply affecting the United States, the situation requires an integrated approach combining Mexican institutional reforms with US cooperation and precursor control. The future depends on institutional capacity and political will.
International Affairs Watch