Back to Data
IAW Analysis

Ethiopian Conflict

Tigray war (resolved), ongoing regional insurgencies, post-conflict transition

Last update: Feb 9, 2026

Scroll to explore

Conflict overview

Risk of localized violence and political-ethnic tensions affecting civilians.

What you'll find on this page

Estimated deaths
0
UN OCHA, Ethiopian Public Health Institute, peer-reviewed mortality studies (Tigray war primarily) · Nov 2024
Internally displaced
0
UNHCR, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Ethiopian IDP Coordination Unit · Oct 2024
Refugees
0
UNHCR Regional Bureau for East and Horn of Africa · Nov 2024
Food insecurity
0
UN World Food Programme (WFP), Integrated Food Security Phase Classification · Sep 2024

Conflict Severity Index

IAW methodology — 5 dimensions, 20 sub-indicators

Stable
0
/100
Medium
5
MIL
6.9
CIV
8
ESC
4
HUM
4.5
INT

The CSI (Conflict Severity Index) evaluates conflict severity on a 0-100 scale, combining 5 weighted dimensions (0-20 each): military intensity, civilian impact, escalation risk, humanitarian access, and internationalization.

Timeline — Key phases

The conflict as process. Each event: context, actors and consequences.

12020-11-01

Tigray War Outbreak

Federal government and Eritrea military intervene against TPLF; massive displacement begins

Context

October 2020: Tensions escalate between federal government under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and TPLF over constitutional authority and federal police force conflict. November 2020: Federal government forces and Eritrean military launch massive military operation against TPLF. TPLF disputes government's constitutional legitimacy. Violence escalates rapidly; tens of thousands killed in initial months. Displacement becomes massive. Media blackout imposed; international access blocked.

Consequences

Rapid escalation to mass atrocities; ethnic cleansing campaigns; use of sexual violence as weapon of war; starvation tactics; genocide allegations

22021-06-01

Humanitarian Crisis Peak & International Pressure

Ceasefire attempts fail; humanitarian access severely restricted; international outcry increases

Context

Mid-2021: Conflict reaches peak intensity despite initial African Union mediation attempts. Federal forces and Eritrean military consolidate territorial control. Atrocities continue; humanitarian access almost non-existent. Over 2 million displaced; famine conditions emerging. Sexual violence used systematically; tens of thousands assaulted. International pressure increases; US threatens sanctions; EU demands accountability. Communications blackout continues, limiting documentation.

Consequences

Humanitarian catastrophe reaches critical proportions; estimated 600,000+ deaths; health system completely destroyed; food insecurity becomes acute

32022-11-01

Cessation of Hostilities & Pretoria Agreement

TPLF and federal government sign ceasefire agreement; disengagement begins

Context

November 2022: After two years of intense conflict and international mediation (African Union, US, EU involvement), TPLF and federal government sign Pretoria Agreement (Cessation of Hostilities). Agreement includes: ceasefire, disarmament of TPLF, federal force withdrawal from some areas, humanitarian access restoration, prisoner release. Implementation begins but faces significant challenges. TPLF begins disarmament; federal government withdraws military from some Tigray areas. Humanitarian access improves but remains limited. Communications gradually restored.

Consequences

Ceasefire largely holds; disengagement progresses; humanitarian access increases; refugee returns begin slowly; reconstruction planning initiates

42023-2024

Post-Conflict Transition & Ongoing Regional Tensions

Ceasefire holds but Amhara/Oromia tensions escalate; reconstruction begins

Context

2023-2024: Tigray ceasefire generally holds; TPLF disarmament progresses. However, tensions between other ethnic groups intensify: Amhara militias clash with federal forces and Oromia forces over border issues and political power. Amhara Fano insurgency emerges, challenging federal authority in Amhara region. Humanitarian situation in Tigray improves marginally; refugees begin returns but numbers remain below 2020 levels. Reconstruction begins but faces massive funding shortfalls. TPLF political rehabilitation debates occur; transitional justice mechanisms discussed but implementation delayed.

Consequences

Ceasefire stability maintained; refugee returns gradual; reconstruction funding insufficient; inter-ethnic tensions replace Tigray war; accountability mechanisms slow

The origin of the conflict

The Sudanese civil war did not begin in April 2023, although that is when the world took notice. Its roots lie in the failed transition that followed the fall of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, after three decades of dictatorship and mass protests that united civilians and the military against the regime.

What followed was a democratization experiment doomed from the start. The Transitional Sovereign Council, composed of civilians and the military, never resolved the fundamental contradiction: who would control the guns during the democratization process? While civilians from the FFC (Forces for Freedom and Change) tried to build institutions, the generals consolidated economic and military power.

The tension between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary militia commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti", became the axis of the crisis. The RSF, born from Darfur militias and used by Bashir to crush rebellions, had transformed into a parallel army with its own funding (Darfur gold, UAE support) and tribal loyalties distinct from the state.

The tipping point came with the negotiation over integrating the RSF into the regular army. For Burhan, dissolving the RSF meant recovering the state monopoly on force. For Hemedti, integration meant losing autonomy and possibly facing war crimes trials in Darfur. The negotiation became a countdown to war.

On 15 April 2023, fighting erupted simultaneously in Khartoum, Darfur and other cities. What initially seemed a quick coup became a war of attrition. The SAF controls the formal state apparatus (airports, ministries), but the RSF dominates entire neighbourhoods of the capital and the gold trade.

The regionalization of the conflict complicates any solution. Egypt backs the SAF (institutionalism, state control), while the United Arab Emirates maintains financial ties with the RSF (commercial interests, counter-insurgency). The war has become a proxy for influence in the Horn of Africa and control of the Red Sea coast, vital for global trade.

Actors and power dynamics

Who holds power, who fights whom. Click to view the dossier.

Humanitarian impact

The humanitarian crisis is not a byproduct — it is a central feature of the conflict.

Internally Displaced
9M+
Cross-border Refugees
3M+
Food Insecure (IPC 3+)
25M
Estimated Deaths
150K+

International response

Resolutions, sanctions, peace processes and ongoing investigations.

UN Security Council Resolutions

Active sanctions

Peace processes & mediation

Investigations & accountability

Peacekeeping missions

Prospective scenarios

Projections for 6–12 months. Triggers, indicators and implications.

Probability:

Fragile Ceasefire & Slow Reconstruction

Ceasefire agreement implementation success International donor commitment Inter-ethnic compromise No major escalation

Probability:

Successful Reconstruction & Reconciliation

Donors fund reconstruction Federal-TPLF power-sharing agreement Transitional justice success Constitutional reforms

Probability:

Ceasefire Collapse & Regional Conflict Escalation

Pretoria Agreement violations Amhara-Oromia escalation Federal government weakness TPLF military resurgence

Monitoring indicators

conflictDetail.indicators.subtitle

Pretoria Agreement Compliance

conflictDetail.indicators.trend.stable

Adherence by both TPLF and federal government to ceasefire terms and disarmament provisions

Overall compliance reasonable; some violations documented. TPLF disarmament progressing; federal force withdrawal from some areas confirmed. Fragility remains.

Humanitarian Access in Tigray

conflictDetail.indicators.trend.improving

UN humanitarian worker movement, aid delivery capacity, communications restoration

Access has improved significantly since ceasefire; still below pre-conflict levels. Communications largely restored. Some areas remain difficult to access.

Refugee & IDP Return Flows

Monthly numbers of Tigray refugees and IDPs returning to communities

Monthly returns averaging 50,000-100,000; well below pre-conflict population. Many fear renewed conflict; reconstruction limited.

Amhara-Federal Tensions

Documented clashes between Amhara Fano militias and federal/Oromia forces

Amhara Fano insurgency emerging; 30-50+ incidents monthly. Risk of expansion. Federal government control challenged in Amhara region.

Food Insecurity in Tigray & Ethiopia

conflictDetail.indicators.trend.improving

Percentage of population experiencing acute hunger (IPC 3/4 or higher)

21.7M Ethiopians food insecure (18% national rate); Tigray affected disproportionately. Improving from peak but still high.

Sources & methodology

Ethiopian data sourced from UNHCR, OCHA, IDMC, Ethiopian Public Health Institute reports, peer-reviewed research, and ICRC. Death estimates (600,000) reflect primarily Tigray war and excess mortality estimates. Current figures reflect post-Pretoria Agreement situation.

Ethiopia has transitioned from Tigray conflict to a fragile post-conflict period. While the ceasefire holds, emerging regional tensions between Amhara and Oromia threaten national stability. Tigray reconstruction requires substantial resources; transitional justice moves slowly. Transition success depends on federal political inclusion, reconstruction funding, and TPLF reintegration.

International Affairs Watch

CSI
0
/100
Medium
Stable